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The Life-Value of Death 
Mortality, Finitude, and Meaningful Lives 
Jeff Noonan* 
 
Abstract 
In his seminal reflection on the badness of death, Nagel links it to the permanent loss “of whatever 
good there is in living.” I will argue, following McMurtry, that “whatever good there is in living” is 
defined by the life-value of resources, institutions, experiences, and activities. Enjoyed expressions 
of the human capacities to experience the world, to form relationships, and to act as creative agents 
are (with important qualifications) intrinsically life-valuable, the reason why anyone would desire to 
go on living indefinitely. As Nagel argues, “the fact that we will eventually die in a few score years 
cannot by itself imply that it would not be good to live longer. If there is no limit to the amount of 
life that it would be good to have, then it may be that a bad end is in store for all of us.” In this 
paper I want to question whether in fact there is no limit to the amount of life it would be good to 
have. My general conclusion will be that it is not the case that the eternal or even indefinite 
prolongation of any particular individual life necessarily increases life-value. Were death thus 
somehow removed as an inescapable limiting frame on human life, overall reductions of life-value 
would be the consequence. Individual and collective life would lose those forms of moral and 
material life-value that form the bases of life’s being meaningful and purposive. 
 
In his seminal reflection on death, Nagel links its badness to the permanent 
loss “of whatever good there is in living.”1 Nagel identifies the good of living 
with the activities and experiences an individual person has over the course of 
his or her life. Death is bad because it deprives individuals of more of these 
goods. It is true that for the individual conceived in abstraction from the natural 
and social worlds of which he or she is a member death is bad because it 
deprives him or her of further experience. However, I will argue that it may not 
only not be bad, but actually a good, even for the individual who dies, if he or 
she thinks of himself or herself not as an abstract centre of experience, but as a 
member of fields of natural life-support and social life-development towards 
which certain duties are owed.2 
                                                     
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Windsor, 401 Sunset Ave Windsor, ON N9B 3P4, Canada. 
1 Thomas Nagel, “Death,” Nous, Vol. 4, No. 1, Feb. 1970, p. 78. 
2 Nagel’s argument is compatible with the conclusion that death can be relatively good if further 
living would produce no more activities and experiences that the person could regard as good. 
Subsequent versions of the ‘deprivation’ account of death’s badness also allow for the 
possibility that death can be a relative good if it brings to an end of life of unremitting pain and misery. 
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This argument will be supported by drawing upon the idea of “life-value” as 
spelled out in the work of John McMurtry. In general, life-value can be 
identified with Nagel’s “whatever good there is in living.” Whatever good there 
is in living, for life-value analysis, depends upon the instrumental life-values 
that living things must appropriate in order to keep on living and to develop their 
life-capacities. Examples of instrumental life-values for human beings include 
food and water, caring relationships that nurture our emotional life, and 
educational institutions through which our cognitive and imaginative capacities 
are developed. 
The good of living as such, however, is not the appropriation of instrumental 
life-values, but the enjoyment of the life-capacities they enable. Intrinsic 
life-value is found in the form and content of the enjoyed expression of the 
human life-capacities to think, imagine, build and create, relate to other people, 
and sense and feel the world around us. 
The crucial difference between life-value analysis and Nagel’s more general 
notion of “whatever good there is in living” is that life-value analysis 
understands people not as abstract egos accumulating experiences for 
themselves, but as members of natural fields of life-support and social fields of 
life-development. Consequently, the good of living is identified not with the 
accumulation of life-value, come what may for nature and others, but with the 
accumulation of life-values in ways that cohere with the sustainability of the 
natural world and the good of others in the social world upon which the 
experiences and activities of the ego depend.3 To be life-valuable, experiences 
and activities must not only be valued by an abstract ego, they must be 
“coherently inclusive” of the on-going life-supportive capacity of the natural 
world and the interests of other people in being able to express and enjoy their 
                                                                                                                                                                     
The position to be defended here is not that death can be a relative good, but good even though it 
brings to an end a life which is still enjoyed by the person to the extent that the person abstracts him or 
herself from their relationships to nature and others in society. For other version of the ‘deprivation’ 
account of death’s badness see Fred Feldman, Confrontations with the Reaper, (New York: Oxford), 
1992, pp. 139-140; Jay Rosenberg, Thinking Clearly About Death, 2nd edition, (Indianapolis: Hackett), 
1997, p. xviii; Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life, (Washington: Georgetown University 
Press), 2000, p. 84; John M. Collins, “The Deprivation Account of Death’s Badness,” Death and 
Anti-Death, Charles Tandy, ed., (Palo Alto: Ria University Press), 2003, pp. 333-358; Ben Bradley, 
“When is Death Bad for the One Who Dies,” Nous, 38 (1), 2004, pp. 1-24. 
3 John McMurtry, “What is Good, What is Bad: The Value of All Values Across Times, Places, and 
Theories,” Encyclopaedia of Life-Support Systems, (Oxford: EOLSS Publishers and UNESCO), 2010, 
p. 74. (www.eolss.net) (accessed, March 14th, 2011). 
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life-capacities.4 When the framework within which the value of death is shifted, 
from the ego valuing its experiences in abstraction from the natural world and 
social relationships to an ego thinking of itself as a member of natural and social 
worlds, the possibility that death can have both instrumental and intrinsic 
life-value emerges. 
It might appear, however, that life-value analysis, committed as it is to the 
ever more coherently inclusive growth of the intrinsic values of experience, 
thought, and action, must agree with Nagel that “the fact that we will eventually 
die in a few score years cannot by itself imply that it would not be good to live 
longer. If there is no limit to the amount of life that it would be good to have, 
then it may be that a bad end is in store for all of us.”5 This conclusion does not 
follow from the premises about life-value sketched above. The task at hand is to 
explain why the indefinite or even eternal prolongation of the life of an 
individual would not indefinitely or eternally increase life-value for the 
individual conscious of himself or herself as a member of natural and social 
fields of life and motivated by the goal of coherently maximising life-value.6 
The argument will unfold in three main steps. In the first, the difference 
between the life-value standpoint and the ego-centric standpoint of the 
deprivation view of the badness of death will be further explicated. In the second, 
two distinct meanings of “death” will be defined and their relationship to the 
instrumental and intrinsic life-value of death be explained. In the final step four 
examples of the life-value of death will be examined and defended. 
 
1. Individuals, Fields of Life, and the Principle of Life-Coherence 
 
It is difficult to avoid egocentrism when the object of consciousness is the 
finitude of an individual’s life. When one brings the power of reflection to bear 
                                                     
4 Ibid., p. 73. 
5 Nagel, “Death,” p. 80. 
6 The final section will reflect upon the possibility of immortality as a foil against which the value of 
finite life can better be determined. It should be noted at the outset that the position defended here 
does not regard immortality as a material possibility, because, as Steven Horrobin argues, immortality 
proper means absolute invulnerability, and material beings like humans always remain vulnerable to 
lethal changes in the external conditions upon which they depend. See Steven Horrobin, “Immortality, 
Human Nature, The Value of Life, and the Value of Life Extension,” Bioethics, 20(6), 2006, pp. 
279-292. Arguments such as Horrobin’s have not dissuaded science from pursuing immortality. For 
the history of such efforts, see John Grey, The Immortalization Commission: Science and the Strange 
Quest to Cheat Death, (Toronto: Doubleday Canada), 2011; for the state of the art see the critical 
overview in Nicholas Agar, Humanity’s End, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press), 2010. 
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upon the necessity of one’s death it is difficult to avoid the feeling that Nagel 
and other deprivation theorists are correct and that more life is, other things 
being equal, always good. The only way that death could be good is in case 
on-going life will be nothing but agony. The principles underlying palliative care 
understand “good” deaths as those which terminate lives in which dignity and 
the attainment of valuable “ego-ideals” are no longer possible.7 This conclusion 
does not contradict deprivation theory, but extends its reasoning to end of life 
care: if there can be no more good in life, then best that it end peacefully. 
Nevertheless, feelings which are understandable psychologically are not always 
philosophically justifiable. A deeper philosophical reflection upon the natural 
and social conditions and relationships upon which individual egos depend 
uncovers the possibility that death itself can be a good, that is, life-valuable, and 
affirmed as such, even by people who love life. 
 Thus, my argument is sharply at odds with positions which regard death 
as a reason to regard life itself as a misfortune, a harm to be avoided. The best 
known argument in defence of this position is David Benatar, who claims that 
because death is such a terrifying prospect to most people, and because it is 
inescapable, the thought and prospect of it is an essential reason why it would be 
better never to have been born.8 While Benatar is to be commended for 
defending a heterodox position that needs to be considered, his argument suffers 
from fatal metaphysical and normative weaknesses. First, Benatar argues that it 
is better to never be born, a position which, if universalized, implies that it is 
better for no one to ever be born, i.e., for the universe to be void of sentient life. 
He forgets, however, that sentience and consciousness are preconditions of there 
being better and worse states, and so his argument implies that it is better for 
there to be a universe in which “better” and “worse” are impossible, a clear 
contradiction. 
Second — and more germane to the present argument — Benatar fails to 
consider the ways in which death, by making all harms finite, makes them 
bearable, and thus, far from being a reason to lament life, is one fundamental 
condition of our being able to live it well. 
Benatar, like others who see death as the absolute negation of life-value, 
                                                     
7 Lars Sandman, A Good Death: On the Value of Death and Dying, (New York: Open University 
Press), 2005, p. 27. 
8 See David Benatar, Better Never to have Been Born, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2006, pp. 
29, 77, 213; and David Benatar, “Why it is Better to Never Come into Existence,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vo. 34, No. 3, July, 1997, pp. 345-355, p. 350 esp. 
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tend to judge death from the perspective of the abstract individual ego mulling 
over its own ultimate non-existence. Such a perspective is of course not wrong, 
but limited. As self-conscious beings humans live their lives from the inside. 
Nevertheless, the self which distinguishes itself from the conditions in which it 
exists is not in reality something absolutely separate from its sustaining and 
supporting natural and social conditions, but rather an individuated moment of 
the natural resources and elements that constitute it and the social relations and 
institutions through which its capacities as a human agent have been developed. 
As McMurtry argues, “the individual is not reducible to, but grounded on . . . 
this life-host [which enables] self-articulation . . . . The individual achieves 
individuality by expressing this social life-ground in some way particular to 
social capacity and choice.”9 The key point is that self-conscious egos develop 
out of natural processes and instituted forms of social organization. Life-value 
develops within these networks of relation between self-conscious individuals 
and nature, social institutions, and other individuals and cannot be reduced to 
simple “pains” and “pleasures” of egos considered in the abstract. If to be 
self-conscious involves understanding the real conditions of the on-going life 
and development of the self, then self-consciousness includes consciousness of 
self as a member of the natural field of life-support and the social field of 
life-development. The fact that as members of natural fields of life-support and 
social fields of life-development human individuals have both life-requirements, 
which can be met only by drawing upon shared resources, and life-capacities, 
which can develop and be expressed only in interactive, interdependent 
relationships with others, has significant implications for the valuation of the 
necessity of individual death. 
Life-value analysis agrees with the deprivation argument that life is good for 
individuals because they enjoy the expression of their sentient, cognitive, and 
creative capacities. However, life-value analysis grounds the individual who 
enjoys life in the natural field of life-support and the social field of 
life-development outside of which no individual can exist. It then asks 
individuals to re-evaluate their individual life-projects with their dependence on 
nature and interdependence with others in society in mind. When set within 
these natural and social fields of life-support and life-development, an internal 
limitation on the value of any individual life appears. Individual life-enjoyment 
                                                     
9 John McMurtry, The Cancer Stage of Capitalism, (London: Pluto), 1999, p. 89. 
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is internally limited by what McMurtry calls the principle of life-coherence. This 
principle asserts that life-value is not unlimited or just anything any ego happens 
to value, including its own on-going existence, but only that which it judges 
good because it “consistently enables human and ecological life together.”10 
When individuals evaluate forms their lives on the basis of this principle, it 
becomes apparent to them that they must consider the implications of their 
decisions and projects for nature and other human beings. They can then 
recognise that it is materially irrational to call “good” goals or projects that 
destroy rather than maintain the natural life-support system and other human 
beings possibilities for living. To reject the principle of life-coherence is to 
selfishly equate life-value as such with what one happens to feel is good for 
one’s self in abstraction from the natural and social bases of one’s individual 
life. 
The principle of life-coherence is an internal rather than external limitation 
on the life-value of individual lives and life-expressions. External limitations on 
the life-value of lives and life-expressions are limitations imposed on the 
individual by forces external to the individual person understood as an 
intrinsically valuable member of natural and social fields of life-support and 
life-development. A politically motivated murder, for example, is an external 
limitation on the life-value of the victim, because her killer treats her as a means 
to his own particular political ends, ends which he regards as of universal value 
but whose particularity and partiality can be demonstrated. The badness of 
external limitations does not lie in their being limitations, but in their being 
externally imposed by self-interested parties. In other words, their value cannot 
be universalized because the project from which they stem is not life-coherent, 
and it is not life-coherent because it treats the other person not as an intrinsically 
valuable bearer of life-value, but as nothing but a means to the self-interested 
ends of the perpetrator. 
 Internal limitations on life-value, by contrast, are those universal 
constitutive conditions of the maintenance, development, and enjoyment of life 
and life’s capacities. Internal limitations are discovered by rational reflection on 
the material conditions outside of which one can neither live, nor value, nor act. 
They are thus limitations that materially rational human beings impose upon 
                                                     
10 John McMurtry, “Human Rights v. Corporate Rights: Understanding Life-Value, the Civil 
Commons, and Social Justice,” Studies in Social Justice, 5(1) (Summer, 2011), p. 13. 
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themselves. This imposition is not regarded as an oppressive burden because the 
goal of materially rational human beings is not just to enjoy their own life, but to 
consciously craft their individual life as a contribution to good of life overall. To 
limit one’s self to forms of capacity development which positively contribute to 
the health and well-being of life-support and life-development systems and 
others’ particular lives, does not entail sacrificing the individual life-value of 
one’s own life, but rather extending the idea of a good life beyond narrow 
enjoyment to include the life-value of the other lives one’s projects can either 
enable or disable.  
It is with these considerations in mind that the problem of the life-value of 
death can be coherently raised. In general, one’s death can have life-value to the 
extent that through it more comprehensive life-value develops. Thus, the key to 
understanding the life-value of death is to judge not from the standpoint of an 
ego who has abstracted his or her private pleasures from his or her relationships 
to others and to the fields of life-support and life-development upon which he or 
she really depends, but from the standpoint of an ego conscious of the internal 
limitations on the life-value of his or her projects, goals, and experiences. 
Shifting the ground of individual evaluation in this way uncovers four ways in 
which death can have life-value. However, before examining those ways, the 
precise senses in which “death” and “life-value of death” will be used must be 
explained.11 
 
2. Two Senses of “Death” and the “Life-Value” of Death 
 
As life-value takes both instrumental and intrinsic forms so too can death 
have instrumental and intrinsic life-value. However, the sense in which “death” 
is used differs in the two cases. In the case of instrumental life-value “death” is 
used in its typical biological sense to mean the permanent cessation of life. To be 
dead in this sense, as Overall says, is “no longer to be, or to have the possibility 
of being, the subject of any experience of any sort whatsoever.”12  
                                                     
11 There has been much work on developing a precise definition of death. The position to be explained 
in section two concerns less the metaphysical dimensions of the problem and more the sense of death 
that is presupposed by the argument that death can have life value. For the more metaphysically 
inclined approaches to the problem of definition see Feldman, Confrontations with the Reaper, pp. 
56-71, Rosenberg, Thinking Clearly About Death, pp. 146, 195; Steven Luper, “Six Philosophical 
Controversies About Death,” Death and Anti-Death, Volume 1, pp. 275-318. 
12  Christine Overall, Aging, Death, and Human Longevity, (Berkeley: University of California Press), 
2003, p. 24. 
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Clearly there can be no intrinsic life-value to the state of being dead for the 
subject who has died, because he or she has permanently ceased to be an agent 
capable of experience and activity. Nevertheless, it is possible that entering into 
this state can have instrumental life-value for others as individuals and for the 
natural and social fields of life-support and life-development generally. 
Death can also have intrinsic life-value for the one who dies. However, the 
meaning of the term “death” differs from the first biological meaning. In this 
second, existential sense, “death” refers not to the state of being dead but to the 
object of consciousness when one reflects upon one’s own mortality. 
Heidegger’s analysis of death yields the paradigmatic expression of this second 
sense of the term: “Death is a possibility-of-Being for Dasein which Dasein has 
to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its own 
most potentiality . . . in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s 
being-in-the-world.”13 In this existential sense, “death” is the object of thought 
of a human being thinking about his or her own eventual permanent demise. The 
existential sense of the term refers to an ever-present possibility with which we 
must live. It is only in this existential sense that death can have intrinsic 
life-value. 
There are four cases in which death can have life-value. In the two less 
controversial cases, death has instrumental value for others who continue to live 
after someone else’s biological death. In the two more speculative cases which 
conclude the paper, death has intrinsic value for the one who dies. In these cases, 
contra the deprivation account, more life without limit would not extend life’s 
goodness without limit. The intrinsic value of life is not an inexhaustible 
resource for any particular individual.  
 
3. Death’s Life-Value: Four Cases 
 
1) Willing Self-Sacrifice 
 
Mature human self-consciousness is aware that life is finite and must end in 
death. 
Assume that a given life is well-furnished with life-requirement satisfiers 
and that its projects are life-coherent and successful. In such a case the 
                                                     
13 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, (New York: Harper and Row), 1962, p. 294. 
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conclusion can be drawn that this life is growing cumulatively richer in 
intrinsically life-valuable experiences and enjoyments and that it is contributing 
cumulatively more instrumental life-value to others’ lives. The pure potential for 
life-valuable experience and enjoyment which marks the moment of birth is 
progressively transformed into actualised life-value, both intrinsic and 
instrumental. If that which is good in living is that which is life-valuable, then 
the more that potential life-value is converted into actual life-value, the more 
good there is in that life. 
Since the actualization of life-value depends upon participation in natural 
fields of life-support and social fields of life-development, the goodness of any 
particular life is never a virtuoso creation, but has conditions which lie outside 
the individual ego. These relationships of natural dependence and social 
interdependence are not simply material facts about human beings, they also 
forge moral connections between selves in society. Of most significance for 
present purposes is the moral tie of reciprocity that develops out of the fact of 
social interdependence. 
As a moral principle, reciprocity means feeling obligated to contribute back 
in some way to the general store of instrumental life-values from which one has 
drawn resources in the course of actualizing life-value. As a felt moral 
obligation, reciprocity is an internal limit on one’s actions: it does not constrain 
as prison walls constrain, it orients to a desired outcome, as a sign points a 
traveller in the right direction. Reciprocity is the principle that underlies the first 
case in which death has instrumental life-value: the willingness to give up one’s 
own life for the sake of others’ lives. As each life is unrepeatable, the 
willingness to sacrifice one’s own life for the sake of others’ greater 
life-potential is a gift from which one can never personally benefit. One is 
giving back after having drawn from, for the sake of ensuring the on-going life 
of others with greater potential life-value left to enjoy. Instead of concentrating 
exclusively on the good of one’s own on-going life in abstraction from the lives 
of others, the self identifies its own good with its capacity to contribute to the 
good of others’ lives, even though it means the end of its own. The instrumental 
life-value in this case is in one sense obvious: others are able to live because one 
person is willing to die. 
In order to unpack this conclusion, recall Nagel’s claim that all of us are in 
for a bad end if it is true that more living is always better than the end of life. If 
this claim is true is in all cases, then it follows that it is better for individuals to 
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live in a society that accepts this principle, and thus supports any course of 
action that individuals may take, short of deliberately ending the lives of others, 
to preserve and extend the length of their own lives. Is this sort of a society more 
instrumentally life-valuable than a society in which the goodness of individual 
life is considered in relation to the social field of life-support in which it 
develops? A thought-experiment may help to answer the question. 
A middle-aged person is driving a car with three small children. The car 
skids off the road, overturns, and catches fire. The adult has time to either free 
the children or himself. 
Is it life-coherent to argue that it would be better for the adult to go on living 
if the only way that could be accomplished would be to let three children to die? 
To answer ‘yes’ would demand that it is possible for that individual to 
coherently justify his actions before his fellow citizens. 
That account would have to prove that he owed absolutely nothing to the 
children he let die and that his own attachment to his personal life-value 
outweighed the greater potential life-value of the children. It is certainly possible 
to imagine someone making such an argument, but also that his future life would 
be one of unending torment as a consequence of the isolation this selfishness 
would surely impose. Hence it would never be life-coherent, even for someone 
who valued only his own life-experiences, to act in this way, because his action 
would condemn him to a future of scorn and ridicule. In that case, the principle 
of maximizing abstract individual life-enjoyment come what may for others 
would seem to be of no instrumental value at all, even to the one who tried to 
maximise his life-enjoyment on its basis. 
On the other hand, a society in which the principle that sometimes greater 
life-value is created when individuals who have actualized much life-value 
sacrifice their future potential life-value for the sake of people who have realized 
comparatively little seems more instrumentally life-valuable. It thus follows that 
the lives of infants (pure potential life-value) and children (higher potential 
life-value) must always be objects of special care in a life-coherent society. 
There are no conceivable situations in which it would be life-coherent to 
sacrifice the lives of children for the lives of adults, even if there were more 
adults saved than children sacrificed. Comprehensive life-value is distinct from 
a crude utilitarian pleasure maximization because it regards potential life-value 
as more precious and valuable (when hard choices have to be made) than the 
immediate present enjoyments lost to the dead adults. Preserving the life of 
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infants and children ensures that more life-value is actualized over the long-term, 
and is a sign of a mature moral consciousness capable of desiring the same 
goods for others as he or she him or herself has enjoyed. For such a mature 
moral consciousness it would be intolerable to go on living in the knowledge 
that his or her life was purchased at the cost of destroying the opportunity of the 
young to actualise their potential life-value. 
A life-coherent society brings out the best moral characteristics of human 
beings: our capacity to commit ourselves as individuals to the life-value of 
others even though we may not be able to enjoy that life-value ourselves. Thus, 
when the individual can contribute to the production of more life-value by 
choosing to die so that more potential life-value may be actualised in others’ 
lives, such a choice is the instrumentally life-valuable one to make. As an 
expression of the highest moral courage and character, such an act transforms 
death from a brute fact of biology to a morally beautiful contribution to the 
social conditions in which others with much unrealized life-potential will be 
able to actualize it more fully. 
To conclude, it must be emphasised that the instrumental life-value here is 
not the brute fact that death enables someone else to live. Were it the case that 
instrumental life-value could be served simply by eliminating some people for 
the sake of others, then the argument would become life-incoherent. 
Life-coherence means organizing society such that the life-value of individual 
lives serves the life-value of others in a conscious way — that we identify our 
good with the individuated contribution that we make to others’ lives. Though it 
serves the overall good, individual choice of how to contribute remains essential. 
That which makes self-sacrifice instrumentally life-value is that the person 
willingly sacrifices future life-value for the sake of others’ greater future 
life-value. If people were targeted for elimination by some ruling elite and 
liquidated, this program would not coherently expand the range of realized 
life-values, but reduce all people to fungible parts of a social machine to be 
replaced when they have worn out. The instrumental life-value of self-sacrifice 
does not justify any sort of externally imposed sacrifice of anyone for the sake 
of anyone else. 
The argument thus avoids the force of Overall’s objection to measuring 
life-times in terms of realized or unrealized potential. She worries that any talk 
of life-time in terms of progressive expenditure of life-potential unfairly targets 
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the elderly as selfish consumers of resources who really just ought to die.14 By 
anchoring the life-value of death to the willingness and choice to die, the danger 
for political abuse in the name of creating “greater potential life for others” is 
obviated. However, an analogous problem arises, in more exigent form, in the 
next case, which concerns the natural deaths of older generations. 
 
2) Valorizing New Potential Life-Value 
 
The conversion of potential into realized life-value involves the 
appropriation of natural resources and the fruits of the cooperative labour of 
other human beings as necessary conditions for the expression and enjoyment of 
an individual’s life-capacities. A life-coherent pattern of appropriation requires 
that any given generation of human beings limit the scale of its appropriation of 
resources and labour to a level that is sustainable over the open and indefinite 
future which we presume human life as such to enjoy. While the life-time of any 
individual is limited, the life-time of the species is open. Life-coherence is not 
relative to the time frames of individual lives, but life itself, whose future is not 
limited by the certainty of death. Hence life-coherent forms of appropriation 
must ensure that resources are preserved for future generations, so long as this is 
materially possible. 
Although he was not concerned with the problem of the life-value of death, 
the pioneer of ecological economics, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, was one of 
the first to grasp the problem of the life-coherent use of resources. He argued 
that “life-quantity may be simply defined as the sum of years lived by all 
individuals, past, present, and future. . . . We need no elaborate argument to see 
that the maximum life-quantity requires the minimum rate of natural resource 
depletion. 
By using these resources too quickly, man throws away that part of the solar 
energy that will still be reaching the earth after he has departed.”15 Factoring in 
life-quality, as life-value analysis requires, would complicate the calculation of a 
life-coherent rate of resource consumption, but not to the point where it would 
be conceptually impossible. 
The more mathematically inclined may attempt such a calculation, but it is 
                                                     
14 Overall, Aging, Death, and Human Longevity, pp. 68-74. 
15 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy law and the Economic Process, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press), 1971, pp. 20, 22. 
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the principle, and not the numbers, that are central to my argument. If one values 
one’s life as a member of natural and social fields of life-support and 
development, and not as an absolute abstraction to be preserved whatever the 
cost, one thereby obliges one’s self to take into account the ways in which the 
length of one’s life and the amount one consumes over a longer life-span impact 
others’ life-quality. As with the case of self-sacrifice, consciousness of the 
principle of life-coherence enables individuals to transcend an ego-centric focus 
on maximal accumulation of personal property and pleasure to take account of 
the need of future generations for natural resources and social wealth. My point 
is not to insist on the need for rationing health care or to dismiss the legitimate 
concerns of those who suffer ill-health while young or middle age for a longer 
life in compensation for the time lost to illness and incapacity. Rather, my point 
is that it is incoherent with the needs of human life as such for a single 
generation to appropriate the totality of resources of the earth’s life-support 
systems. The same argument holds for one’s own life-span. Since maintaining 
life requires resources, life-coherent choices about how long it is good to live 
must take into account the consequences of such choices for as yet unborn 
generations. 
Life-coherent decisions about the social policies that contribute to increasing 
the life-span of some groups in the present must take into account the 
life-requirements of others, both in the present and in the future. Here again, a 
willingness to die proves instrumentally life-valuable, not only in the obvious 
sense that the death of one generation creates space for newer generations to live, 
but more importantly in helping to cultivate habits of thought and practice in the 
present which aim to ensure the possibility of at least as good a future for the 
unborn as those who live good lives now enjoy. People cultivate healthier 
attitudes towards the environment, consumption habits, and the life-interests 
they share with other people, now and in the future. 
Life-conditions may thus be improved in the present and life-support 
systems preserved for greater potential numbers of people in the future. 
The optimal rate of life-coherent resource consumption would be that which 
simultaneously enables the highest total number of people to live at the highest 
shared level of life-quality enjoyment. In this way, total life-value for the species 
can grow if those currently alive are willing to die without expending 
life-incoherent amounts of resources trying to keep themselves alive for an 
indefinite future. 
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It does not follow that a life-coherent rate of resource use is, to use Overall’s 
term, “apologistic” about the relative shortness of human life.16 Nor does it 
follow that each individual must accept an abstract individual duty to die after 
some arbitrary threshold of resource consumption has been crossed, as John 
Hardwig, for example, argues.17 The duty in question here is a social duty borne 
by individuals to think of themselves as members of finite fields of natural 
life-support and social life-development, and to make their choices about life 
cohere with the maximization of life-value over the open ended future of the 
species, of which they are a part. The realization of this duty is not incompatible 
with “prolongevitist” demands to increase the human life-span, so long as 
everyone in the world benefits from the increase and the level of consumption it 
demands does not surpass the optimal rate of life-coherent resource use.18 At 
that point, generational death after as full and complete a life for all as the 
life-coherent rate of resource consumption permits can be recognised as 
instrumentally life-valuable, because it encourages “the kind of behaviour that 
seeks to preserve and improve life beyond ourselves,” both in the future and the 
present.19 
Despite the apparent life-value of these considerations, the attempt to 
consider the life-interests of future generations is controversial. Overall, for 
example, is sceptical as to the moral value of limiting present enjoyment for the 
sake of future generations as yet unborn. She worries that there are metaphysical 
problems in ascribing a duty held by persons in the present towards people who 
do not yet exist. 20  However, these metaphysical worries stem from an 
illegitimate reification and abstraction of the future as some thing which is not 
yet present and therefore not real. In truth, the future for time-conscious human 
beings is not some thing that will emerge ex nihilo at some fixed time which is 
not-yet, but is seamlessly engendered by the actions present human beings take 
to reproduce life. Future generations are thus seamlessly engendered by present 
reproductive acts. The obligation to future generations is an obligation to each 
newborn generation of humans, extended over the open time-horizons of the 
species. 
The first two cases of the life-value of death, while not uncontroversial, are 
                                                     
16 Overall, Aging, Death, and Human Longevity, pp. 23-63. 
17 John Hardwig, Is There a Duty to Die, (New York: Routledge), 2000, pp. 19-36. 
18 Overall, Aging, Death, and Human Longevity, pp. 96-7. 
19 Irving Singer, Meaning in Life, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 2010, p. 120. 
20 Overall, Aging, Death, and Human Longevity, p. 136. 
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relatively concrete forms of biological death’s having instrumental life-value for 
others, in the present and the future. The remaining two cases are more 
speculative. Both concern the different ways in which the existential meaning of 
death has intrinsic life-value for the individual who must die. 
The first of this concluding set of cases concerns a necessary connection 
between consciousness of death and the capacity to value life-valuable things. 
 
3) Valuing Life-Valuable Things 
 
People can take for granted or waste things that they believe to exist in 
abundance. Rare and fragile things, by contrast, are cared for deeply. For 
centuries human beings regarded natural resources as inexhaustible, and wasted 
them as a consequence. While toxic effluents were pumped into the atmosphere, 
herculean efforts were undertaken to preserve art works. Both oxygen and art 
works have life-value, the first as an element that sustains life, the second as a 
creation that elevates human sensory experience beyond biological 
instrumentality. However, they are not of equally fundamental life-value, 
because without a breathable atmosphere we cannot live, and if we cannot live, 
we cannot create or experience art. Yet, until it became apparent that breathable 
air was not an unlimited resource, the atmosphere was not the object of explicit 
valuation. 
The point of this contrast is to emphasise the difference between 
something’s having life-value and people choosing to value it. As the foregoing 
example illustrates, the fact that a resource or creation has fundamental 
life-value does not entail that people will actually value it. Could this tendency 
to not value that which is thought to exist in abundance not also negatively 
affect to ability to value life-time, to the extent that its necessary finitude is 
ignored? The claim there is that the existential sense of death as consciousness 
of the end of each human life is an enabling condition of any person actually 
valuing the life-valuable resources, relations, goals, and activities that comprise 
that life. 
To meditate on one’s ultimate finitude is a challenging and often painful 
experience, and people often flee from it and live as if life-time were an 
absolutely abundant resource. Yet, like the earth’s atmosphere and waters which 
used to be wasted, people who treat life-time as an absolutely abundant resource 
often fail to make quality use of that time. In fact, quite often people experience 
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the unlimited time they pretend they have (but in reality do not) as burdensome, 
raising problems for Nagel’s contention that if life is good more life-time is 
always preferable to less. By all conventional metrics life is good when people 
have the means to pursue the objects of their desire. Yet, as Adorno argues, 
life-pursuits can become boring when living is easy. Life-time then becomes 
experienced as a curse, not a joy to be savoured, but empty time to be “killed.” 
“What keeps all living things occupied and in motion is the striving for 
existence. With existence, however, once secured, they do not know what to do: 
thus the second force that sets them in motion is the striving to be rid of the 
burden of existence, to make it imperceptible, to “kill time,” i.e., to escape 
boredom.”21 Such a response would seem impossible to the extent that the real 
finitude and profound shortness of life were made the object of consciousness. 
In other words, the more one meditates on the shortness of life, the more 
intensely will one value the limited range of experiences, activities, and 
relationships that fill out one’s life. Boredom will become correspondingly less 
of a problem. 
Collectively, human beings have worked to reduce the threats to their 
individual survival, and in some parts of the world, for some people, have 
succeeded. This success means more empty time for those who can afford it. 
Because immediate survival pressures are relaxed, people in such propitious 
circumstances can think of their life-time as unlimited. 
Such people feel no existential time-pressure to do one thing rather than 
another at any given moment. Yet the relaxation of this existential time-pressure 
does not motivate them to greater heights but causes them to search for ways in 
which consciousness of surplus time can be overcome. Thus people waste the 
surplus time they have, because, by ignoring their mortality, they fail to 
appreciate the true scarcity of life-time. 
This conclusion can be supported by considering again the most commented 
upon literary exploration of the consequences of immortality, “The Makropulos 
Secret,” by Karel Capek. The philosophical implications of the essential content 
of the narrative were examined in a famous paper by Bernard Williams.22 His 
                                                     
21 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, (London: Verso), 2002, p. 175. 
22  Karel Capek, “The Makropulos Secret, Toward the Radical Center: A Karel Capek Reader, Peter 
Kussi, ed., (North Haven, CT: Catbird Press), 1990, pp. 110-177. Bernard Williams, “The 
Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality,” Problems of the Self, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 1973, pp. 82-100. 
 17
paper is still giving rise to criticism today.23 For Williams, the essential message 
of the play is that immortality would become tedious because all human beings 
have a determinate character, which sets open but nevertheless real limits on 
what we are capable of taking an interest in, learning, and doing. The 
protagonist of the play, Eva Makropulos, comes to regret taking the potion that 
makes her immortal because she ceases to be able to feel anything at all. “You 
are so near everything! For you, everything has meaning. For you, everything 
has value because for the few years that you are here, you don’t have time to live 
long enough,” she shouts at her mortal companion. But for her, released from 
the brevity of a normal life span, “Everything is so pointless, so empty, so 
meaningless.”24 Eternal life does not enable her to love life more, it destroys her 
capacity to love anything at all. Ultimately, every experience becomes a 
repetition of earlier experiences to the point where there is simply no reason to 
care whether one thing or its opposite occurs. That which is valuable in finite 
life — achievements, beauty, relationships, goals — lose their value when the 
existential pressure generated by limited life-time is removed. 
Now, it is true, as Overall argues against Williams’ interpretation, that 
literary texts do not provide knockdown arguments against the desirability of 
unlimited life.25 Still, philosophical reflections upon literary explorations of 
fundamental problems that can never be fully experienced in reality can have 
epistemic value even if they do not yield conclusive proof of a conclusion. One 
can think of a literary exploration of unending life as a thought-experiment: a 
construction designed not to explore immortality in a literal sense, but rather the 
value of finite life by comparing it with a fictionalized immortality. The 
conclusion of this thought experiment is not meant to be certain, but only 
plausible. An analogy can be drawn between the reasons why the fictional 
character Eva Makropulos rejects her immortality and the reasons why actual 
people who treat their lifetime as unlimited tend to experience the empty time 
they do have as the cause of boredom.  
                                                     
23 Hunter Steele, “Could Body-Bound Immortality be Liveable?” Mind, Vol. 85, pp. 424-427; John 
Martin Fischer, “Why Immortality is not So Bad,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 
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for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 58, 2005, pp. 27-36; Timothy Chappell, “Infinity Goes up on Trial: 
Must Immortality be Meaningless? European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 17, 2007, pp. 30-44; Lisa 
Bortolotti and Yujin Nagasawa, “Immortality Without Boredom,” Ratio, Vo. XXII, No. 3, Sept., 2009, 
pp. 261-277. 
24 Capek, “The Makropulos Secret, pp. 173-174. 
25 Overall, Aging, Death, and Human Longevity, p. 159. 
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Thought together, these reasons yield insight into the intrinsic life-value of 
death in the existential sense by clarifying why finite life is an enabling 
condition helping people to value that in life which is life-valuable. Note that the 
claim here is not that death makes resources or experiences life-valuable, but 
rather that it is a frame which allows people to experience their scarcity, and 
thus to value them. Nutritious food is life-valuable whether one judges it good to 
eat or not. But those who value being alive and meditate on the shortness of 
lifetime will be more motivated to value foods which better contribute to their 
health so that they can be as active as possible in their finite life. Consciousness 
of death thus illuminates for us the field of life-value in ways that can be ignored 
when lifetime is not treated as a scarce resource. Hence, consciousness of death 
is intrinsically valuable for all who meditate upon it as the source of the drive to 
live well, because the opportunity to live well is unrepeatable. 
It is the efforts that people make to live well that enable them to distinguish 
themselves as specific persons who have contributed something real and 
particular to the world in which they live. This contribution is the substance of 
the meaning of their individual lives, and, as such, the core of its intrinsic 
life-value. This conclusion leads to the second and arguably most important case 
of the intrinsic life-value of death: as a frame for individual life, it makes lives 
specifically meaningful wholes that have been valuable for the self and for 
others with whom that self has shared the world. 
 
4) Making Life Specific, Complete, and Valuable for Others 
 
Human beings whose fundamental natural and social life-requirements are 
regularly met are able to invent and choose between alternatives possibilities of 
experience, activity, and relationship. The wider the set of possibilities, the 
richer in potential life-value any individual’s life is. It would thus seem to follow 
that a person furnished with life-requirement satisfiers over an unlimited amount 
of time would face a happy future of unlimited life-value potential. However, 
the soundness of this apparently straightforward conclusion, is not as obvious as 
it might first appear. Potential life-value is converted to individually unique 
actual life-value through the choice, in concrete contexts, from amongst the 
unlimited variety of ways that human sentient, cognitive, imaginative, and 
creative life-capacities can be realized. Life-value is not an abstraction; its 
reality lies in its making life worth living for definite individual people. People 
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become definite individuals, this or that person, with this or that character and 
interests, and most importantly, with this or that contribution to make to the 
world, through choices which permanently exclude some possibilities from 
being realized by virtue of the choice to pursue other options. One’s identity as 
an individual is shaped by the choices one makes, and the choices one makes are 
in turn shaped by the values that one serves within the natural and social worlds 
in which ones live. If somehow the ultimate limiting frame of death were 
removed from human life, so too would the necessary condition of life’s being 
made a uniquely life-valuable whole. “The virtue of a mortal life” write the 
authors of a report on the bioethical implications of life-extending technologies, 
“consists not so much in that it leads to death, but in that it reminds us, by its 
very nature, that we will someday die, and that we must live in a way that takes 
heed of that reality.”26 I will argue that it is only in the confrontation with our 
finitude that we can fully commit ourselves to lives which are, viewed as wholes, 
worth living, for self, others, and world. 
Again, this claim may seem counter-intuitive from a life-value standpoint. 
One could reasonably argue, as Nagel and other deprivation theorists do, that 
death is always bad just because it prevents any particular individual from 
experiencing and doing everything possible. In this view, death is the height of 
existential injustice because it ultimately robs people of the life-enjoyment its 
experiences and activities generate. Would not the capacity for absolutely 
unlimited experience and activity result in unlimited life-enjoyment? No matter 
how rich and full of life-value a given mortal life is, an infinite set of 
possibilities will always remain unexplored. While this conclusion might be a 
source of psychological lament if the human good and bad is understood as 
nothing more than the accumulation of experience by an ego that thinks of itself 
in abstraction for natural fields of life-support and social fields of 
life-development, it is not the case that removing death as the ultimate limit on 
individual experience and activity would result in unlimited life-value. 
If consciousness of the finitude of life — the existential sense of death — 
were removed from human life, so too would be the depth cause of one’s having 
to choose between alternative paths of capacity realization be removed. In a 
finite life people set goals to become this or that sort of person, and they must 
make these choices, because finite life-time does not permit the exploration and 
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Council on Bioethics, (New York: Harper Perennial), 2003, p. 186. 
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realization of an unlimited number of possibilities. Not all lives are as good as 
other lives and not everyone thinks as deeply about how they ought to live as 
others do. These are complex psycho-social problems that this argument cannot 
solve. The focus here is on the underlying onto-ethical problem for human 
beings: how can we learn to value the fact that since we cannot experience all 
that it would be possible to experience over an infinite time frame we must make 
choices between different life-valuable pursuits? The answer is: by accepting the 
fact that it is choice and limitation that constitutes our lives as individual and 
distinct contributions to the natural and social worlds that sustain us. As Singer 
argues, “not only do active creatures behave as if their immediate concerns are 
valuable, but also words like “good” and “bad,” “right and wrong,” “beautiful” 
and “ugly” — the terminology of value in general — must ultimately refer back 
the needs, drives, the impulses, the feelings and motives that arise from the 
organism’s struggle to exist . . . . Life has meaning for creatures that engage in 
the active preservation of their mode of existence.”27 Were death somehow 
overcome, then people would no longer need to struggle to exist, and if they no 
longer needed to struggle to exist, they would no longer need to make evaluative 
choices between different possibilities. Such lives would be insipid, devoid of 
meaning because they would be devoid of the limitations that force mortals to 
reflect upon different possibilities for action: which course is better, which is 
worse, which is good, which is bad, which is right, which is wrong. 
If this deepest material-existential reality of human life — being finite 
members of natural and social fields of life-support — is ignored in favour of an 
abstract ego-centrism in which the self is driven only by its desire to accumulate 
as much pleasurable experience for itself as possible, human beings become 
blind to the natural, social, and moral ties that link our lives to the planet and the 
lives of others. If one acts as if one has no need of others and that others have no 
need of oneself then one is saying that others have no value to oneself, but also, 
that one has no value to others. Even if one can bear this deep purposelessness, 
there is a further negative consequence that cuts closer to the heart of the egoist: 
if all possibilities for living were open to everyone over an unlimited time frame, 
and everyone sought to maximise their experiences and activities, the more 
everyone would tend to become the same. The longer such lives went on, the 
less individuated would materially distinct people would become. The 
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specificity of individual life would tend to be eroded along with the drive to 
make contributions to others’ lives that comes along with consciousness of one’s 
self as a finite member of natural fields of life-support and social fields of 
life-development. 
Makropulos’ lament discussed above supports this claim. She realized that 
life-experience extended over too long a time collapses the specificity of an 
individual life into an unbearable grey uniformity. Elimination of death as the 
limiting frame on life-activity causes her to cease caring about what sort of 
person her choices show her to be. The example makes it plausible to argue that 
lives that no longer had to confront the finitude that death imposes would lose 
the necessary condition that currently encourages people to expend real effort to 
make intelligently discriminating choices between better and worse forms of life. 
Finitude generates purpose because the needs and vulnerabilities it entails link 
us together and force us to differentiate between actions which are of ultimate 
importance (those which enable the expression and enjoyment of life-value) and 
those which are not (‘time-killing’ in Adorno’s sense above). 
When one consciously lives one’s life within the finite frame that death 
imposes, the primary goal of life becomes to express, enjoy, and create as much 
life-value as possible. For socially self-conscious finite agents, aware of their 
dependence on nature and interdependence with others in society, this goal is not 
exclusionary and selfish, but inclusively life-coherent. Such an agent cares about 
the natural and social worlds in which he or she lives, and therefore about the 
other people who share that world, because he or she understands that his or her 
private experiences depends upon the degree and depth to which nature and 
society are able to satisfy his or her life-requirements. Consequently, the actions 
one enjoys as an individual is always life-coherent action. Life-coherent action 
is defined by conformity with the principle of life-coherence discussed above. 
Any project is life-coherent that makes individual life meaningful and valuable 
by virtue of the contribution it makes to maintaining and improving the natural 
and social worlds to which everyone, including the agent, belongs. 
When individuals enjoy the projects through which they individuate 
themselves by contributing to the life-value of the natural and social worlds they 
share with others, the opposition between distinct individuals and between 
individuals and social institutions as perceived limits on individual freedom and 
happiness is overcome. The dissolution of the opposition between people is not 
at the same time the dissolution of the differences between them. On the contrary, 
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more comprehensive satisfaction of life-requirements increases the life-valuable 
differences between people by enabling them to pursue their own 
self-development more comprehensively. “Comprehensive” does not mean 
“boundless,” and the limitations that stand in the way of any person’s having a 
boundless variety of experiences are what distinguish one person from another. 
Realized actions within the necessary imitations of finite life make people 
distinct individuals whose lives, become whole through death, are subject to 
evaluation. Living a life that is the object of evaluation is the very essence of 
living a meaningful life. A life that was truly meaningless would be a life that no 
one else was even conscious of ever having been lived, because it had absolutely 
no effects on anyone or the world. 
Life becomes whole for each person through death. Once death has occurred 
the person can no longer edit and revise their character or the contributions that 
they have made to the world of nature and other people. Those contributions 
become a matter of public record and an invitation for others to think about the 
life now passed, but also their own in reflected light of other lives. Living with 
consciousness of death enables people to project their lives as a potential whole 
while they are still living, for the sake of self-critical evaluation, which in turn 
affords them chances to revise goals, renew efforts, and deepen commitments. If 
people block consciousness of death through living moment to moment for the 
sake of idiosyncratic individual pleasures alone, then they run the 
soul-destroying danger that Ivan Ilyich discovers to his horror once he is forced 
to confront his mortality: that everything he had served in life was wrong. “It 
struck him that those scarcely detected inclinations to fight against what the 
most highly placed people regarded as good . . . might have been the real 
thing . . . and his professional duties, and his ordering of his life, and all his 
social . . . interests . . . might all have been false. . . . He saw plainly that it was 
all . . . a horrible monstrous lie. . . . This consciousness increased his physical 
suffering tenfold.”28 In order to avoid Ilyich’s fate people must reflect upon the 
deep value commitments their lives as a whole serve while they are alive and 
capable of changing them if found wanting, because there will come a moment 
where it is no longer possible to change course. Rather than die in fear that one 
has left the most important elements out of life, one can die and cede one’s place 
to others confident in the knowledge that one’s have contributions have been 
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life-valuable. As Ron Aronson reflects, “Am I a good father? Friend? Mate? 
Citizen? Am I living fully? Ami I making good use of my abilities? Am I acting 
morally? Am I acting to make the world a better place? These are only a few of 
the self-judgement questions that we ask frequently. Dying . . . injects into them 
the urgency of a life that is irreversible and final.”29 
Ultimately the life-value of death comes down to making each moment of 
life urgent. A life without death would be a life without urgency, the endless 
accumulation of experiences of no value to anyone else outside one’s own skin. 
By imposing absolute limits, death makes life the object and subject of the 
ultimate and highest value. In making people conscious of life’s ultimate and 
highest value, death imposes on people the demand to never waste time but to 
remain constantly engaged in life-valuable activities when they are active. To 
treat life — not one’s own particular life exclusively — as of ultimate and 
highest value means to act so as to ensure that the natural and social worlds 
human beings share enable everyone’s life-capacities as fully as possible over 
the open ended future of human existence. In this way the mortal individual is 
able to give shape and meaning to her or his own existence and to transcend the 
finitude of their organic life through the permanent contributions they make to 
the life-support and life-development systems that live on after they have died. 
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